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I. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to discuss economic and trade relations in Southern Africa, 
both the current status and options for the future. The region considered covers eleven 
countries, namely, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Tanzania, Angola, 
Mozambique, Malawi, South Africa, Namibia, and Swaziland. The analysis will cover both 
trade in commodities and labor. Trade in labor, as a factor of production, will be analyzed 
between South Africa and the rest of the countries. The implications on both commodity 
and factor trade are analyzed in a post-apartheid South Africa. Special attention is also 
given to relations pertaining to the transport, energy sector, financial sector and capita! 
markets development in the region. We should put it clear at this stage that one broad 
objective is to analyze how and why the relations among countries will change when the 
situation in the powerful South African economy normalizes. The paper proposes that 
SADCC would have to be to substituted by a larger region organization that includes South 
Africa and Namibia. This new organisation we refer to as the Southern Africa Common 
Market Area (SACMA). The increasing organization of the world into trading blocs is one 
compelling raison detre for a new regional organization. The paper also discusses the main 
impediments to regional trade and proposes policies for trade improvements.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II compares and contrasts the 
different economies in Southern Africa and Section III looks into the trade issues. In 
Section IV we shall discuss the trade flows among the countries, noting the most active 
trade linkages. Trade in factors of production in the form of migrant laborers in South 
Africa is considered in Section V. The current and future state of the transport and 
communication sector receives attention in Section VI, while regional energy policies are 
discussed in Section VII. Policy issues for improving regional trade in Southern Africa are 
analyzed in Section VIII, and Section IX is the conclusion.
Southern African countries cover an area that is about 6 million km1, and their 
combined gross domestic product was US$92,535 million in 1988, excluding Angola. With 
a gross population of 98.2 million people, the region has a GDP per capita of US$942.8 per 
annum. South Africa’s dominance in the region is revealed by its GDP of 
US$74,136 million, which is about 80 percent of the regions GDP. Table I below shows 
the countries’ main economic variables. The other nine countries' GDP is only about 
25 percent of South Africa’s GDP, meaning that the country’s level of economic activity as 
measured by the GDP is four times larger than that of its nine neighbors.
Even with the largest population in the region of 33 million people, its GDP per capita 
is still the highest at US$2,246.2 per annum. Zimbabwe, whose GDP is only about 
8 percent and 6 percent of South Africa’s GDP and regional GDP, respectively, has the 
second largest GDP of US$5,598 million. The gap between the first two countries is 
astounding. This says something about South Africa's immense endowments with natural 
mineral resources and a larger population, which is one third of the region's population 
and provides a larger domestic market.
With a GDP level of US$ 2,735 million , nearly half that of Zimbabwe, Zambia comes 
third. This is a country rich with one mineral resource, copper. Its dependence on this one 
resource has left the country susceptible to volatility in the copper market. Botswana 
follows closely to Zambia, with a GDP of US$2,577 million and Tanzania follows closely 
too with a GDP level of US$2,492 million.
Namibia, which got its independence from South Africa in 1989, after 60 years of 
South African rule, follows Tanzania with a GDP of USSI554 million. Namibias’s GDP is 
about 2 percent of that of South Africa, even though its area size is three-quarters of 
South Africa. Thereafter the sequence is Malawi (US$1,401 million), Mozambique 
(US$1,052 million), Swaziland (US$582 million) and Lesotho (US$408 million). Lesotho, 
the smallest country, contributes about 0.5 percent to regional GDP, and is about 
0.6 percent of South African GDP. The gap is very wide.
As an indicator for potential income distribution the table above shows the GDP per 
capita. The advantage of having a small population, but a richly endowed economy with
II. Economies of Southern Africa1
1 Data on Angola has been difficult to obtain, and our discussion will thus exclude it.
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natural resources, is easily reflected by the GDP per capita. In this respect, Botswana 
which is number four in GDP size, is number two after South Africa, in GDP per capita 
with a GDP per capita of US$2,147.5. With a population 1.2 million people and large 
diamond reserves, this is easy to explain. This characteristic also extends to Namibia 
which lies in third place with a GDP per capita of US$1,195.4. Both Botswana and 
Namibia are large countries with deserts which deterred massive settlement in those areas 
during the time when free movement in the region was possible, thereby keeping the 
populations very low.
Zimbabwe which is second after South Africa in GDP size, is number five in terms of 
GDP per capita. Its GDP per capita is US$622 per annum which is even below that of 
Swaziland, the fourth largest. Even though Swaziland is not well endowed with natural 
resources, it has a small population of 0.7 million people, the same size as the Gambia. 
Zimbabwe is a diversified economy, with strength in agriculture, manufacturing and 
mining sectors, and the GDP per capita as an aggregate indicator cannot reflect this. 
Lesotho and Malawi have almost equal GDP’s per capita of US$204 and US$200, 
respectively. Tanzania follows with GDP per capita of US$108, while Mozambique is last 
at USS7S.1 Mozambique, has been devastated by the civil war. It is one country with a 
very large potential for agriculture, given its fertile and underutilized land.
At the risk of using a simple definition of industrialization which concentrates only on 
the size of the manufacturing sector and industry, let us look at the relative sizes of 
industry, and manufacturing, in each of the countries. We are going to make a decision 
about the level a country’s industrialization only on the basis of the following criteria.
Firstly, a country is deemed industrialized if at least 25 percent of its GDP comes from 
the industrial sector. In accordance with the IS1C classification industry has five divisions 
which are mining and quarrying (division 1); manufacturing (division 2 and 3); 
construction (division 4); and electricity, gas, water and sanitary services (division 5). 
Secondly, about 60 percent of industrial output should be produced by the manufacturing 
sector. Finally, at least 10 percent of the population should be employed in the industrial 
sector.
On the basis of this definition only two countries. South Africa and Zimbabwe are 
industrialized. In South Africa, industry contributes 52 percent to GDP while the 
manufacturing sector contributes 24 percent. Zimbabwe’s industry accounts for 46 percent 
of GDP. However, its manufacturing sector contributes 30 percent to GDP while that of
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South Africa is lower, at 24 percent. In both countries manufacturing is quite diversified. 
South Africa is a world leader in the technology of extracting fuel from coal, through its ■ 
SASOL I, SASOL II and SASOL III projects. Zimbabwe acquired this technology from 
them, thus easing the oil shortage problem in the country.
In Zimbabwe agriculture is the largest single employer and the largest foreign exchange 
earner , while manufacturing earns less foreign exchange than agriculture. In South Africa 
agriculture contributes about 5.8 percent to GDP which is lower than that in Zimbabwe, 
where agriculture accounts for 11 percent of GDP. In Zambia the industrial sector is 
dominated by mining, where copper is the single largest product and earns nearly 
90 percent of the country’s foreign exchange. In Zambia agriculture contributes 11 percent 
to GDP. However, the country has been known to import food in drought periods, but this 
phenomenon could be eliminated by using better farming techniques.
In Tanzania and Malawi, where agriculture contributes 59 percent and 37 percent to 
GDP, respectively, this sector is more important, because industrial output is low in both 
countries. The same goes for Mozambique where agriculture contributes 35 percent to 
GDP, compared to the 12 percent contribution of industry. Botswana's industry has the 
largest share in GDP of 58 percent. Within that the manufacturing sector is quite small, 
accounting for only 6 percent of GDP. The implication is that mining dominates 
industrial output and indeed export earnings. Namibia also falls in this category with a 
large mining sector and a small manufacturing sector. The corollary is that even though 
manufacturing contributes a mere 5 percent to GDP, industry accounts for nearly one 
third (32 percent) of GDP in Namibia.
To measure the degree to which a country is monetized we shall use the ratio of money 
in circulation to the gross domestic product. We analyzed this ratio for 1988 in each of the 
countries except Angola. From the results in table I above, Mozambique has the highest 
degree of monetization, (37 percent) as measured by the money-GDP ratio. With an 
inflation level of 35.9 percent, it is not unreasonable to posit that the excess supply of 
money is causing most of that inflation. The reasoning follows from both the Fisherian 
and Cambridge versions of the quantity theory of money. Zambia too seems to have that 
problem, with a degree of monetization of 23 percent and the highest inflation in the 
region of 55.6 percent. However, South Africa has the same level of monetization as 
Zambia at 23 percent, but its level of inflation is four times smaller than that of Zambia. 
This is a clear case where money supply has been used as macroeconomic tool. South
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Africa uses money supply (M3) targeting and interest rate targeting as a major tool for 
controlling inflation.
In the case of Tanzania and Malawi, with money-GDP ratios of 21 percent and 
12 percent respectively, but close inflation levels of 31.2 percent for Tanzania, and 
33.9 percent for Malawi, inflation cannot be solely attributed to monetary or demand pull 
factors. Cost-push inflation, especially imported inflation is a big contributor to the 
general level of inflation. Because of a shortage of vital imported inputs, there is a less 
than full employment equilibrium where the aggregate supply curve is in elastic. The 
result is a rapid rise in inflation with only minute increases in aggregate demand.
Zimbabwe's low monetization level of 16 percent is due to a monetary policy of 
keeping money supply growth low to avoid demand pull inflation. But the low inflation 
level of 7.4 percent in 1988 should not only be viewed as the success of restrictive 
monetary policy. Price control and subsidy policies have been utilized to keep inflation 
low. Botswana has the lowest money-GDP ratio of 8 percent and the second lowest 
inflation level of 8.4 percent, possibly signifying the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
keeping inflation down.
Only two countries in the region recorded Central Government budget surpluses in 
1988. Botswana recorded the highest budget surplus of 15 percent of GDP, while 
Swaziland’s budget surplus is a quarter of that, at 4 percent of GDP. Even with a budget 
surplus, Swaziland recorded a foreign debt worth 44 percent of GDP. Mozambique has the 
highest deficit in the region, mainly due to expenditure on defense for the civil war going 
on there. The case of Zambia is extreme because not only does it have a large budget 
deficit of 15 percent of GDP, but its foreign debt exceeds the gross domestic product by 
35 percent, at 135 percent of GDP.
Malawi too seems to have both a budget deficit and a foreign debt strain, at least by 
the 1988 figures. With a budget deficit of 8 percent of GDP and a foreign debt worth 
83 percent of GDP, the debt-service ratio is quite high. Zimbabwe’s budget deficit is also 
high at 10 percent of GDP. This is attributed to the high recurrent expenditure on 
education and defense, where the latter may be contributing to some resource leakage. 
Zimbabwe has never defaulted on its foreign debt payments amounting to 28 percent of 
GDP and a debt-service ratio that is over 20 percent. The country is considering 
implementing a much needed structural adjustment program, one of whose aims is 
financial discipline on the part of Central Government. The program will run for five
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years, from 1990 to 1995, and will require assistance with foreign funds, for itsaggregate 
cost of ZS3-4 billion. Namibia with a foreign debt of 22 percent of GDP from the 1988 
figures, needs financial discipline as well.
The South African case is quite interesting because its foreign debt is only 1.4 percent 
of GDP, but it has a large domestic debt. Even though it has been negotiating payment of 
its foreign debt since 1985 through the Interim l, II, and III arrangements, domestic debt 
will become a problem in future once the hardle of foreign debt has been cleared. Its 
foreign debt is about R 23 billion and it has already negotiated an Interim III arrangement 
for the period 1990 to 2000. During the period 1990 to 1993 it will pay back USS 1.5 
billion of its outstanding short term debt in eight installments and this amount is 20.5 
percent of total short-term debt.
Tanzania seems to be the prudential case in the region, with the lowest budget deficit 
of 2 percent of GDP and the very low foreign debt of 0.1 percent of GDP, from the 1FS 
1988 figures. At least for this country's foreign debt will not be a future problem, unless 
the country engages in massive borrowing of short-term loans, in the next few years.
III. Trade issues in Southern Africa 
I .Openness and current account
In this section we shall look at the trade statistics and traded commodities in Southern 
Africa. Table 2 shows the current account and degree of openness of each country.
The degree o f openness o f a country is defined as the sum o f imports and exports as 
a percentage o f the gross dom estic product. That is,
(1)D  -  (E + M )/GDP,
where D <• Degree o f openness, E ■  Exports, M » Imports, and GDP » Gross Domestic 
Product. The 'openness', essentially  refers to openness to foreign trade, in the form o f 
export to other nations and imports from other nations. Presumably, indices such as the 
Nominal Rate o f Protection (N R P), E ffective Rate o f Protection (ERP), and Domestic 
Resource Cost (DRC), ate much better measures o f protection or openness to imports. But 
we require extensive and highly disaggregated data to be able to calculate these. Our 
degree o f openness index still gives a rough indication on protection against imports and 
incentives for exports. The larger the index, the higher the degree o f openness and the
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opposite is true.
From Table 2, Lesotho has the highest degree of openness with an index of I.SS. This 
implies that the sum of exports and imports is 55 percent higher than GDP in that country. 
Swaziland also has a high degree of openness at 1.32, followed by Namibia at 1.13. These 
three countries belong to the South African Customs Union (SACU) and the Rand 
Monetary Area (RMA). That explains the high degree of openness since their main 
trading partner is South Africa. Lesotho has the highest current account deficit as 
a percentage of GDP in the region, with a figure of -18 percent. The implication is that 
the country is open to imports but less is exported, also putting pointers to inadequate 
exports incentives. On the other hand Swaziland has second largest current account 
surplus after Botswana, that is 17 percent of GDP. Swaziland is somewhat export oriented 
basically exploiting its available capacity in the tradable goods sector.
Being members of the Rand Monetary Area, Lesotho’s, Maloti and Swaziland’s 
Emalangeni, have a one-to-one exchange rate with the South African Rand, with the same 
exchange rate of 0.42057 against the U.S. dollar in 1988.
Among countries with a degree of openness index less than one, Botswana has the 
highest index of 0.97. Also, the country is doing well in the trade sector, with a current 
account surplus of 17 percent of GDP. Zambia has an openness index of 0.69, but posseses 
the second largest current account deficit of about 11 percent of GDP.
Zimbabwe, with a degree of openness of 0.58, exhibited almost balanced commodity 
trade in 1988, with a low current account surplus of 0.9 percent of GDP. At a superficial 
level, the country seems to be following good trade policies. But the current account 
surplus is a result of deliberate import control policies through import tariffs and foreign 
exchange allocation. These restrictions forced the trade account to balance with little left 
to market forces.
Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa have almost equal openness indices with exports 
and imports amounting to half of GDP. But both Malawi and Tanzania have current 
account deficits of 8 percent and 10 percent of GDP, respectively, while South Africa has 
a small current account surplus of 2 percent of GDP. May be the price export incentives 
offered by the low exchange rate in Tanzania are not enough to stimulate exports. It may 
be the case than there are few products to export and/or products with an available export 
market cannot be exported due to structural factors e.g. transport, and that information on 
export markets is not available to potential exporters. Therefore, devaluation without
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structural incentives for exporters, will not be enough to stimulate exports in Tanzania. 
2.Export diversification
For the promotion of future trade in Southern Africa, it is pertinent to assess the 
degree of export diversification among member countries. One index that measures export 
diversification is the Gini-Hirschman concentration index (GH). Regarding exports, the 
index is based on the ratio of the value of each exported commodity to total exports. If a 
country has diversified exports, the share of each exported commodity to total exports will 
be quite small.
Let X) be the value of the exported ith commodity, and let x, be the total calue of exports. 
Then the Gini-Hirschman (GH) concentration index is given by
(2) GH -  ( 2 (Xi/x,)1)*/1
i-1
where n is the number of commodities exported by the country. When there is export 
diversification, the index approaches zero as (x /x ,) gets smaller. When exports are 
concentrated on a few commodities, the value of x, is almost as large as xt , resulting in the 
index approaching a value of one. Then, the index is equal to or greater than zero, but can 
only be at most equal to one.
That is.
(3) 0 s GH s I
It is notable that the export Gini-Hirschman concentration index essentially measures 
dispersion. It measures the degree of dispersion about a value of zero, which corresponds 
to total diversification, i.e. (xj/x,) -  0. But a single value of the GH index does not tell us 
much. It is only useful if one compares GH values for different countries and/or the same 
country in different periods.
The Gini-Hirschman concentration indices for 1987 were calculated for each country 
in the Southern Africa region and the results are in Table 3. From Table 3 Zimbabwe is
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the most diversified country in terms of exports. Zimbabwe's biggest export is tobacco 
and beverages which account for about 23 percent of total exports. Ferro-alloys also 
account close to 20 percent of exports. The rest of exports include, meat (3 percent), 
maize (4 percent), malted barley (0.3 percent), refined sugar (1 percent), crude materials 
except fuels (16 percent), chemicals (I percent), manufactured material goods (3 percent), 
machinery, transport, radio/TV and electrical equipment (3 percent), and other 
miscellaneous products (0.3 percent).
The second most export diversified country is Tanzania, with most of its exports 
concentrated on the agricultural ash crops. In 1987 coffee accounted for the largest share 
of 32 percent in exports, and cotton, the second largest cash crop accounted for 20 percent 
of exports. Manufactured products contributed 19 percent to exports. Other exports 
include tea (5 percent), tobacco (3 percent), cashew nuts (4 percent), petroleum products 
(2 percent), minerals (6 percent), and other commodities (16 percent).
Mozambique comes after Tanzania with an export diversification index of 0.S2SS. In 
1987 its main exports were lobsters (40 percent), shrimps (28 percent) and cashew nuts 
(18 percent). Other exports included, cotton fibre (3 percent), sugar (1.3 percent), tea 
(2 percent), wood (1.8 percent), coal (0.1 percent), citrus fruits (1.1 percent), cashew shell 
oil (I percent), and copra (0.8 percent).
Malawi with a Gini-Hirschman concentration index of 0.6441 in 1987, mainly exported 
tobacco which accounted for 62 percent of exports that year. Sugar and tea each 
contributed to 10 percent to total exports. Other exports are ground meats (2 percent), 
cotton (0.1 percent), pulses (4.3 percent), coffee (3.4 percent) and other exports including 
rice at about 8 percent.
Zambia is the least diversified country in the region with a GH concentration index of
0.9325. Zambia's largest export is copper which invariably accounts for at least 92 percent 
of exports and earns more than 92 percent of foreign exchange for the country. Strong 
reliance on one mineral such as copper, has put them in deep jeopardy where, agriculture 
and manufacturing have been neglected. Export earnings and hence growth are strongly 
depended on the movement of copper prices in the international copper markets. Other 
exports are cobalt (9 percent), zinc (2 percent), lead (0.7 percent) and tobacco 
(0.3 percent).
The second least diversified country in exports is South Africa, with a GH 
concentration index of 0.8931. Gold bullion and gold coins, by far the largest exports.
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accounted for about 74 percent of total exports in 1987. But the country does export 
manufactured goods amounting nearly 30 percent of total exports, the highest figure for 
manufactured exports in the region. That reflects on the relatively advanced 
manufacturing base in South Africa.
The country also exports food and livestock (8 percent), beverages and tobacco 
(0.2 percent), chemicals (3 percent), machinery and equipment (4 percent) and other 
miscellaneous commodities. The third least undiversified country is Botswana with an 
index of 0.8497. This country relies on diamonds which account for 8S percent of exports, 
followed by copper nickel matte (4 percent), textiles (2 percent), meat livestock (3 percent) 
and other commodities. Again we see the reliance on one primary commodity and a 
neglect of the manufacturing sector
IV. Trade Among Southern African Countries
UmpoitrCMart matrix
This section will focus on commodity trade flows among countries in Southern Africa. 
While the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC) countries 
have strived to cooperate in both development projects and trade, very little trade has been 
achieved. Trade among SADCC countries excluding South Africa and Namibia, is still 
below S percent of total foreign trade of the region. Table 4 and Table S reveal some 
trade statistics within SADCC countries.
Trade among the nine states belonging to SADCC has remained static and low for 
over IS years, as shown in Table 4. Exports going to the SADCC region reached a peak of 
4.6 percent in 1982 and the lowest level was 2.9 percent in 1979. Exports to SADCC have 
not risen above 4.5 percent of total foreign exports. The same picture is given by imports. 
Imports reached their highest level of 4.9 percent in 1970 and in 1979 reached their lowest 
ebb of 2.7 percent. Imports have not risen above 4.9 percent of all foreign imports. This 
is mainly attributable to the fact that the SADCC countries produce raw materials and 
therefore cannot export to each other.
The manufacturing industries also produce similar common goods such as textiles. It is 
precisely the lack of industrialization in manufacturing which keeps the demand for raw 
materials within SADCC low. Countries such as Botswana and Zambia that rely on single 
minerals, diamonds and copper, especially, will never find a growing market in SADCC, 
both in the short-run and long-run.
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Zimbabwe has a dominant role among the SADCC countries. It controls 26.8 percent 
of SADCC imports and S4.8 percent of SADCC exports. From Table 5 above,
Mozambique follows closely contributing 23.1 percent to SADCC imports, but has the 
lowest exports to the region after Lesotho. While Zimbabwe dominates exports, Botswana 
has a balanced picture, accounting for 20.9 percent of SADCC imports and 20.2 percent of 
SADCC exports. Zambia's picture is also less unbalanced than Zimbabwe's, as it accounts 
for 12 percent of SADCC imports and 10.8 percent of SADCC exports.
One question we may ask is how much trade flow among individual countries takes 
place and what commodities are traded. The best way of summarizing this information is 
an import-export table, based on the lines of an input-output table. Table 6 below is an 
import and export table showing trade flows among countries in 1988. The availability of 
data on trade flows between some countries has been disappointing, particularly for 
Angola. Data for South Africa and Namibia's trade flows with Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland has been difficult to obtain.
In the intraregional trade, the most active trade link is that between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. In 1988, Zimbabwe imported USS25S.8 million worth of goods which 
accounted for 71 percent of its imports from the region. For South Africa this amounted 
to 40 percent of its regional exports. Regarding exports, Zimbabwe exported 
US$136.3 million worth of goods to South Africa, representing 37 percent of its regional 
exports but 77 percent of South Africa's regional imports.
Angola's export market in the region is Zimbabwe, which absorbs 68 percent of its 
exports. Although the figures on imports in Table S above indicate that Zimbabwe is the 
largest source of imports for Botswana, in the region, this is not accurate, because we do 
not have the trade figures with South Africa. Under the SACU arrangement Botswana 
imports nearly 80 percent of its goods from members of SACU, which implies that South 
Africa must be its main source of imports. The same argument goes for Lesotho which 
also has a common currency with South Africa, under the Rand Monetary Area 
arrangement.
Botswana’s export market is the SACU member countries which absorb 9 percent of its 
total exports. Outside SACU Zimbabwe is Botswana’s main market, Botswana exports 
animal and vegetable crude materials, clothing, animal oil and fats, and textiles. On the 
other hand Zimbabwe exports sugar, textiles, manufactures of metal, vegetables, cement, 
furniture, articles of rubber, and finished structural metal parts. Botswana also exports
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meat and by-products, edible oils, hides and skins to Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, 
and Lesotho. It also exports soda ash tallow and candles to Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
and Swaziland.
Outside the South African market, Lesotho exports processed fruit and vegetables, 
garments, footwear, furniture, m edicines, tallow and candles, ceramic ware and building 
materials, to Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, M alawi, Tanzania, 
and Swaziland. It essentially exports to all the countries in Southern A frica, one or more 
o f the commodities above. Swaziland another member o f SA C ll, exports meat and by­
products, sugar, edible oils, beverages, garments, furniture, wood and pulp, paper 
products, soda ash, tallow and candles, explosives, paint and varnish, trailers, to all 
SADCC countries including South Africa. At least one o f these items is exported to each 
country.
M alawi's biggest trade partner for its source o f imports is South Africa were worth 
USSI07.3 million in 1988, representing 75 percent o f the country’s imports from the 
region. South A frica is also Malawi's largest export market in the region worth U S$253 
m illion in IMS representing 45 percent o f the country's export to the region. This 
dependence on South Africa has always existed and w ill become stronger when the 
situation in South Africa normalizes. Outside South A frica Malawi exports at least one o f 
the foQcrwing com m odities in  the regioac processed  fruit and vegetables, groundnuts, dried 
beans and peas, sugar, tea. tobacco and products, textiles and cotton, paper products, 
structural fabrication, and industry amchiaery. to all the SADCC countries.
Mozambique is  dependent on South A frica and Zimbabwe for imports, and to the 
former for exports, h  I9gg it  imported U S$973 m illion worth o f goods representing 
56 percent o f in  regional imports , w hile it exported goods worth US$6.7 m illion to South 
A frica. Meoamhiqwe'x capons in  the region include m ilk, fish , tea, garments, footwear,
T n n n it'i biggest trading partners are ?sm bn and Zimbabwe, as far as imports are 
concerned. The country imparted US$7.7 miKon and US$7.4 mflGon worth o f goods from  
Ztm bis and Zimbabwe, respectively, in  19M . The two countries supply I f  percent o f 
Tanzania’s  tntpmn in  the region. However,  its biggest export market happens so be 
Meaambiqne w hich jmpnrtrd U S$33 ariOion worth o f imports from Tanzania, which 
represents <1 percent o f  Tanzania's region exports. Tanzania's exports to  the regioa 
iactade m cataad by  prudncts. edible o f t . co ffee , sugar, spices, tea. honey, beverages.
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tobacco, blankets, sisal products, garments, leather products, paper products, fertilizer, 
insecticides, soap and detergents, ceramic and glassware.
Zambia's trade relations in the region are strongest with South Africa and Zimbabwe.
In 1988, 72 percent of Zambia’s imports in the region worth USS186.4 million, came from 
South Africa, while it exported 38 percent of its products to Zimbabwe and only 
17 percent to South Africa. Like all the countries in the region Zambia’s exports are still 
in the form of primary products or raw materials. Its exports which cover all countries in 
the region include, ground nuts, sugar, tobacco, textiles, wood and by-products, lime, 
glass products, cement, copper and products, lead, zinc and aluminum utensils.
We have already alluded to the fact that Zimbabwe is one of the dominant countries in 
the region. Its trade with Botswana resulted in US$73.8 million worth of imports, 
amounting to 2 1 percent of regional imports, making it the second supplier of imports to 
Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s exports to the region includes edible oils, coffee, sugar, garments, 
hides and skins, footwear, chemicals, cement, steel ingots and bars, copper and products, 
lead, zinc, industrial machinery and earth moving equipment.
The main hinderance to increasing trade in the region is the production of similar raw 
materials by member countries. Trade in agriculture can only experience sudden demand 
shocks if one country is experiencing drought conditions otherwise demand will always be 
low.
V. Trade in labor
Not only do countries in Southern Africa have commodity trade with South Africa, but 
also trade in factors of production. In 1986 there were 378,125 workers in South Africa 
from the neighboring countries, where remittances accounted for a considerable part of 
some countries’ capital account inflows. The actual figure for migrant workers in South 
Africa is higher than that given in official statistics because workers are dispersed in 
various sectors, some workers are employed seasonally while some are illegally employed. 
Table 7 shows the number and percentage of migrant workers in South Africa from 
neighboring countries. Most migrant workers from other countries are employed in the 
mining sector which in 1986 employed 83 percent of the foreign workers. Agriculture 
employed 3.7 percent. The other sectors’ employment in 1986 were the following:
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manufacturing (2.4 percent), construction (2.4 percent), commerce (1.2 percent), domestic 
services (3.1 percent), and government and other services (3.3 percent).
Before we analyze the origin of foreign workers let us take a look at the remittances 
and deferred payments of foreign workers to their countries of origin. Table 8 shows their 
remittances and deferred payments from 1980 to 198S.
By far the largest supplier of foreign workers in South Africa is Lesotho. From 
Table 7, Lesotho supplied 138 193 workers in 1986, amounting to 36.3 percent of all 
foreign workers. It should be noted that this share increased from 36.7 percent in 1975 to 
49.9 percent in 1982, and thereafter has continued to decline. The sharpest drop was from 
1982 to 1983, where the share dropped by 9.2 percent. Even in terms of number of 
workers, Lesotho labor force in South Africa has generally been declining since 1975.
From Table 8 we can see that remittances and deferred payments have been rising even 
though the number of people employed has been falling. In 1980 remittances amounted to 
R 153.3 million, and in 1983 they increased to R 280.6 million and increased further to 
R 401.2 million in 1985.
Remittances by migrant workers increased from 38.7 percent of GDP in 1978 to 
52.4 percent of GDP by 1982. If remittances amount to half of a country’s GDP then, the 
magnitude of dependence is quite alarming. Every year out of 30,000 people who enter 
employment, nearly 4,000 of them, that is 13.3 percent seek employment in South Africa 
as migrant workers. Nearly, 75 percent of the Lesotho workers are employed in Welkom 
Goldfields which is on one-and-a-half hour by bus from the Lesotho border. Nearly 
70,000 of them commute home for weekends.
Mozambique is the second largest supplier having supplied 73,186 workers in 1986, 
worth 19.4 percent of all foreign workeis that year. From 1960 to 1974, Mozambique used 
to be the largest supplier of foreign workers, accounting for about 25 percent of the total 
mine labor force in South Africa. In some of the years during this period they exceeded 
100,000, but Mozambican workers have also faced the severest drop from 150,738 workers 
in 1975 to only 73,186 in 1986. The sharpest drop in the 1975-86 period was in the five 
years from 1975 to 1980 where the drop was from 150,738 in 1975 to 60,490 in 1980. The 
substantial drop is attributed to Mozambique's independence from Portugal in 1974.
One could imagine the unemployment impact of this decline back home in 
Mozambique. But may be the civil war absorbed most of the workers into the army, but 
then what will happen when the civil war ends. Even with this decline in employment
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levels the value of remittances of migrant laborers to Mozambique increased from 
R 66.6 million in 1980 to R 189.S million in 198S. This merely reflects the increase in the 
average wages of South African workers, at least in nominal terms.
Malawi’s contribution to the foreign labor force in South Africa is the third largest, 
having accounted for 31,411 workers in 1986 or 8.3 percent of all foreign workers. Its 
share has been declining steadily from 10.8 percent in 1980 to 8.3 percent in 1986. 
Remittances contribute about 2.5 percent of GDP and the number employed in South 
Africa is nearly 7 percent of Malawi’s total formal sector employment. In 1975 Malawi 
had 39,308 workers employed in South Africa and the number declined to 31,411 in 1986. 
The decline is explained by the fact Malawi needs more workers for its plantations and 
peasant farms.
In 1974 Malawian workers died in an air crash on their way home, and the 
Government used this accident as a reason for withdrawing workers from South Africa.
But the main reason was labor shortage at home and the air crash was just a trigger for the 
withdrawal decision. Recruitment still exists, as Table 7 shows an increase from 
30,144 workers in 1985 to 31,411 in 1986. The Malawian Government benefits from 
remittances which increased from R 30.7 million in 1980 to R 77.8 million in 1985.
Botswana supplied 28,244 workers to South Africa making up 7.5 percent of foreign 
labor force in 1986. This is a drop from the 10 percent contribution of 1980. In 1986 the 
Botswana labor force in South Africa was equivalent to 5 percent of the economically 
active population of Botswana. Remittances of workers have been increasing from 
R 32 million in 1980 to R 47.6 million in 1983 and R 76.2 million in 1985.
Swaziland's contribution to the South Africa labor increased from 11,981 in 1980 to 
21,914 in 1986, 82.9 percent increase. Even in percentage terms, Swaziland’s share 
increased from 4.1 percent in 1980 to 5.8 percent in 1986. This amounts to 17.7 percent of 
Swazi workers in formal employment. The increase in migrant workers has come as a 
partial relief to Swaziland whose economy has been slowing down in growth. Remittances 
by Swazi migrant workers was R 61.3 million in 1985, accounting for 3.5 percent of GDP.
Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s workers in South Africa has dropped from 
20,540 in 1980 to 7,304 in 1985, a fall from 7 percent to 1.9 percent, respectively. 
Zimbabwe is the only country showing a fall in remittances from R 15.4 million in 1980 to 
R 13.6 million in 1985. On the other hand, Zambia has fewer workers, merely 2,421 in 
1986, with remittances worth R 1.5 million. Angola has virtually no labor force in South
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Africa, with only 22 workers in 1986, a phenomenal drop from 623 workers in 1973. The 
remittances are quite small, only R 0.1 million for each of the three years 1980, 1983, and ' 
1983.
The future of the migrant workers in South Africa is uncertain. Unemployment is 
increasing in South Africa, and after the situation normalizes, wages may go up making it 
attractive for the self-employed to enter the formal employment, even in the mines. 
Besides, there could be new laws that favor the employment of South Africans to other 
* nationals.
What would this mean for the foreign workers and their countries? Firstly, the foreign 
workers would lose their jobs and new labor would not be recruited. This would threaten 
the income security of the workers and their families. Secondly, unemployment in the 
neighboring states would grow, especially in Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland, and 
Botswana which are heavily depend on South African employment. The respective 
governments would be faced with the ubiquitous unemployment problem, which is 
politically risky. Thirdly, income remittances from the foreign workers, that support the 
capital account and GNP would be threatened as workers are retrenched. Countries such 
as Lesotho whose GNP is immensely supported by remittances would face serious 
problems, with declining domestic productivity. Finally, the number of people below the 
poverty datum line would increase, and rural income would generally fall as remittances 
dwindle.
If the neighboring countries do not solve their current unemployment problem urgently 
it will get worse when their citizens are retrenched from South Africa. Mozambique has a 
double edged problem because it also has some of its citizens working in East Germany. 
Their workers will be some of the first to lose their jobs as Germany unification takes 
effect. Mozambique had 12,093 workers in East Germany, and these will return to swell 
the unemployment level.
VI. Transport and communication*
1 The main source of information in this section is Hanlon, J  (1989), "SADCC in the 
1990s*. Economist Intellieence Unit. London, and readers should refer to Hanlon (1989) 
for a detailed analysis of the issues.
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In the early part of this century goods from land-locked countries, then Nyasaland and 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia which are now Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, 
respectively, were exported mainly through Mozambique and Angola. After the 
independence of Mozambique and the declaration of UDI in Zimbabwe, more goods 
passed through South African ports. In fact. South African ports became a focal point for 
most of the trade for all t„e land-locked countries in Southern Africa.
l.Rail transport
The railway system in Southern Africa ramifies through the 11 countries under study. 
The 1,067 mm (3 ft 6 in) British gauge, spans a length 40,000 km: 22,600 km in South 
Africa (including Namibia), 12,500 km in SADCC and 5,000 km in Zaire. The rest of 
Tanzania’s railway line, outside the Tazara line linking Zambia and Tanzania, is the I m 
gauge based on the German and French systems. This part is not considered to be part of 
the SADCC railway system.
Below, is Table 9 showing the railway distances to major ports within SADCC and 
South Africa. What is not included in the picture are the ports of Walvis Bay and Luderitz 
in Namibia, which have the convenience of being close, for countries such as Botswana.
In the SADCC region, about 64 percent of all SADCC projects were in transport and 
communication, which amounted to $4.8 billion.
Trade through the Mozambique ports of Beira, Maputo, and Nacaia has been declining 
since 1981. In land traffic in 1981 was 5.9 million tons, 2.9 million tons in 1984, 3.0 mil­
lion tons in 1986, and 2.8 million tons in 1987. The decline in traffic is attributable to 
security problems in Mozambique. In 1987 Zambia stopped exporting its copper through 
South Africa, and most of it now goes through Dar es Salaam and some through Beira.
The Beira corridor has been Zimbabwe's preoccupation for sea transport since 
independence. Beira is also the nearest port to Harare. This rail corridor has been 
defended by Zimbabwe’s army since November 1982, probably costing about ZS100 mil­
lion a year. At the beginning of 1986 the Beira corridor was made a  priority project by 
SADCC and given a 10-year development plan. It has received funding from Austria, 
Sweden, Norway, and U.S.A. At the beginning of 1989, it was to receive $676 million in 
projects, $444 million was under negotiation, and the rest will be received later during the 
10-year plan period. Of the 22 donors involved, Italy had the highest donation of
17
SS6 ■ tlliw . n a a ly  for railway facilities. The Froaomic Community and Netherlands, 
*i*in * 15? atiHian aad S33 rad io*, respectively. are financing the rehabilitation of pom. 
M rtfc  co— tries ate donating >122 anBion for coaainer and oil terminals. while the 
“V ** **—v  f r r  T ft miPina for p tn jrm  surf ITpin H  laiHhra f i r  TtfiBtimnl
Local cargo aad p a through the 7imhohwe pipeline rose fr o *  1.4 m illion tons in 19*6, 
■ r i t s U r a d r a r a s it lN L  Rail traffic rase froai less tk u  400,000 tows ia  19*6 to  
650,60(1 tens in  M tt. Daring th esaraep eriod ctn n n en  haw lledrosefrora5,000 to 
lS ,n m  Wanciitty, ia pw u  r a  Beira rase by 39  percent in (9tS . In 19*1 Zambia seat
KVf mn irinn inf irmiiDH i lihiioanih Ih in  n hir 7irahnhnir*r M inn ill Blutcrini fnipninrinn 
(MMCZJi sent 55.080 H as o f asbestos, meet, mineral aBoys, graphite, and copper, throngb 
the B a te  post.
T he Id e a  Corridor Group (BCG) o f Zimbabwe, which is  a coasortiara set op by 270 
Zimbabwean eaaapanrrs to proauie the corridor in U K , has been the flagship in the 
dnactapmeat o f  access rathe Beira port. Each company ctratribnsed SZ^OO to BCG and it
swabs atone with the MoaambiqBe company Aastral to locate oppoetanities for investment 
its dm cerridsr. The See to Nacala part is afeo qpsae as developed as the Berra corridor. 
Franca; f » ~ * . Itertngat, d t  E C , and Fn h nd  hose offered to donate d e  entire S261 miL-
T h r Taaata line waahnJb by * e  Chin n r  in  MW and fc te  Zambia rathe post of Por- 
tS-SMham. Table M  shows traffic dfeaagh Tazara raiiway Bae. The peak year for the 
T a n s im i> D w -< s-h b n a w B iit  IC T . and MW seas i s  worst yam, and by M B! it  had
I MW.
a
corridor (Dar-es-Salaam), and 11,000 tons through Nacala.
The Limpopo-Maputo corridor is also expected to be an asset. The National Railways 
of Zimbabwe is doing most of the reconstruction of the Limpopo railway line to Maputo, 
and Botswana will provide S3 million worth of concrete sleepers for 100 km of track. 
Mozambique Railways (CFM) has rehabilitated 40 km of the rail nearest Maputo. It is 
expected that in 1989 the line should have carried about 360,000 tons in both directions on 
completion of the first phase. The line will carry about 840,000 tons a year, and the 
projection is 1.4 million tons by the year 2000. Maputo will also be linked to Swaziland if 
donor funds are available. Such a link will involve about S42 million worth of investment.
The Benguela railway line is also on the SADCC agenda. This line links Lobito port of 
Zaire to Zambia. In January 1989, $580 million was requested from donors. Already 
$90 million of the S96 million required for the first phase has been pledged by the 
Economic Community, Nordic countries, Brazil, World Bank, and the Africa Development 
Bank, and others. It is expected that the capacity of the line would be about 900,000 tons 
a year after the 5 years of the second phase, which brings it to its I960's capacity.
South Africa’s railway system is controlled by the South African Railways and 
Harbours Administration, an organization of the Department of Transport. The system 
covers the whole country and is well linked to the seaports of Port Elizabeth, Capetown, 
East London, Durban, Richards Bay, and Saldanha Bay. By the end of 1978 South Africa’s 
railway system totaled 22,644 km of 1,067 meter gauge, and 70S km of the 0.610 meter 
gauge for its minor branches. Currently the South African railway system is linked to the 
rail systems of Zaire, Zambia, Mozambique and there is potential to link it to the Tazara 
line to Dar-es-Salaam and Benguela Rail in Angola.
2-Air transport
The South African Airways has a developed Southern African network and has the 
greatest diversity in the region. Its internal network is well developed as well. The key 
airports in South Africa are Johannesburg, Capetown, Durban, Port Elizabeth, East 
London, and Windhoek. In 1980 all airports handled 151,834 tons of air cargo, with 
Johannesburg accounting for 104,796 tons within that cargo.
Due to recently completed extensions on airports in Dar-es-Salaam, Gaborone, 
Lilongwe, Maseru, and Manzini, all SADCC countries can now handle long haul aircraft.
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Table 11 gives a breakdown of passengers per week within the SADCC region. It is clear 
that there is more air traffic between SADDC and South Africa (SI 10) than there is among 
SADDC countries (2,335). Trips to Southern Africa account for 68.6 percent of the trips 
and 33.3 percent of passengers within the region are carried by South African carriers.
Ties with the South African transport system reflect the extent of economic ties that exist, 
or even the cultural ties. Within the other countries belonging to SADCC ties have failed 
to deepen. Each country has its own airline and will not allow another airline to crowd it 
on traditional routes. Flying an airline degenerates to national pride as opposed to an 
economic transport requirement. Most airlines within the SADCC region make losses, and 
calls for a "SADCC airline* have been made, but we are certain they will be ignored.
3-Tclecommunications
The importance of telecommunication for economic cooperation among countries is of 
vital importance. Why should a businessman in Harare (Zimbabwe) find it easier to 
telephone London than Lusaka (Zambia)? This reflects on the need for better links within 
Southern Africa in the field of telecommunication. What is encouraging is that all nine 
SADCC countries now have earth stations.
Microwave links exist between Zimbabwe and Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana, 
Tanzania, and Malawi, also between Zambia, Mozambique, and Malawi. International 
exchanges exist in Zambia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. The growth of telecommunication 
within SADCC was about 22 percent per year, between 1981 and 1987, and international 
traffic growth teas about 10 percent during the same period. During 1981-1987 period 
SADCC air traffic with South Africa grew only 2 percent annually. During th is period  
there teas a dramatic increase of 67 percent per annum between Zimbabwe and Tanzania, 
and 32 percent per annum between Zimbabwe and Zambia, while that between Zimbabwe 
and South Africa dropped by 2 percent per annum.
But the growth figures pertaining to South African links underestimate the degree of 
linkage. In 1980/81 the total paid minutes for telecommunication was 1,801,000 for the 
iatra-SADCC region, and 5,951.000 in 1986/87, but the traffic from SADCC to South 
Africa was about 9 times bigger at 14,741,000 in 1980/81 and 16,709,000 in 1986/87.
Even though the ram o f growth indicates slower growth of telecommunication with South 
Africa, but the volume of traffic is quite large. Telecommunication in 1987/87 between
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South Africa and SADCC accounted for 42 percent of all international traffic in Southern 
Africa.
Like most projects in the region, telecommunication projects were and are still 
financed through donor funds. For the 34 projects in the sector, S330 million of the 
proposed $689 million has been raised, for the 10-year plan set out. The biggest donors 
are Italy ($76 million), Japan ($66 million), and Sweden ($18 million), and the Africa 
Development Bank ($48 million). The funds will be used for the establishment of new 
earth stations and/or exchanges in Angola, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Tanzania. This 
will enable countries to digitalize their systems and line up with Intelsat VII, by 1991.
4.Future policies for transport and telecommunication
The development of transport and telecommunication in Southern Africa has relied on 
foreign aid and donations. The big question is whether this aid continue to flow in the 
future and what are the repayment costs involved Generally, donors are beginning to 
reconsider the objectives of giving aid money where returns are low or nonexistent. There 
is some competition for the world pool of funds by East European countries. This implies 
that future aid for developing countries may decline and Governments with the assistance 
of the private sector in these countries will have to finance these projects. The 
Governments may have to borrow from organizations such as the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank, and domestic development banks. Inter-Inter-governmental 
aid is likely to dwindle.
Besides, if the political situation in South Africa improves, some of the SADCC 
projects may suffer adversely. The Beira corridor, for instance, might experience a fall in 
cargo handled at the port of Beira. It would be more costly to have the bulk of trade for 
both Zimbabwe and Zambia, transported through the Beira corridor. Zambia may return 
to its earlier route of transporting its copper exports through South African ports. 
Zimbabwe will also reduce its traffic on the Beira corridor, and switch the bulk of it to 
South African ports. But the BCG has argued that in August 1988 it cost $400 less to 
import a 20 ft container via Beira than via South Africa.
But the maintenance costs of the corridor will prove to be high for both the 
Mozambican and SADCC governments. With South African ports, other countries will not 
have to worry about maintenance costs, the Government there has the capacity to take care 
of it. Besides, the port of Beira is congested and this will not improve until 1991, because
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work is running more than a year behind schedule. This is a good case for Zimbabwe for 
switching exports of such minerals as asbestos, steel, mineral alloys, graphite, and copper 
to South African ports.
That part of the Beira corridor which connects Beira to the North of Mozambique (to 
Moatize coal mine) and Malawi, was initially funded by East Germany. Now with a 
United Germany, will this commitment be honored? We should be allowed to speculate 
that this assistance will cease and with the security situation in Mozambique not 
improving, the line may never be rehabilitated to full capacity even in the far future.
The Tazara route to Dar-es-Salaam has been hit by management problems and 
underpowered locomotives. These problems have plagued the line at least for the last ten 
years. In Tanzania and Zambia there is no civil war, such as in Mozambique which has 
paralized the transport system. The line has operated under peaceful conditions but it still 
needs attention. It is unprofitable for instance for Zimbabwe to transport its coal through 
Tazara for export through Dar-es-Salaam. Average transport costs and mining costs 
outweigh the average price per ton of Zimbabwean coal.
On the other hand, the South African Railways is subsidized and is more efficient.
With the situation normalizing there, some of the traffic from Zambia may go through 
South Africa. Besides the South African transport services will continue to cut the rates 
for ports handling of cargo more aggressively, to maintain and indeed increase its share of 
regional transport system. Unless SADCC countries reduce their tariff charges 
competition with South African railways will be stiff.
Regarding air transport, national airlines will continue to operate even though they 
make losses. That is an issue of national pride. But air traffic with South Africa will 
increase when the situation normalizes. But I would be persuaded to think that the South 
African airlines and South Africa private air companies will monopolize the SADCC-South 
African air traffic because businessman from that country are likely to increase their 
activities in the region.
We mentioned earlier that telecommunication between SADCC countries with South 
Africa grew at only 2 percent per year and in fact with Zimbabwe it has been falling by 
2 percent per year. In a post-apartheid South Africa, there will be an increase in 
telecommunication activity with Zimbabwe due to business ties with South Africa which 
have existed since the birth of the two countries. But the digitalization of 
telecommunication in SADCC must be encouraged to improve communication with the
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rest of the world, and the link to the Intelsat VI in 1991 should be seen to happen and 
looked forward to.
Basically, intra-SADCC transport system might be weakened in a post-apartheid South 
Africa. Trade routes will be diverted to South Africa. But in the long run even the South 
African ports, and rail and road systems, will also be congested. May be we may see some 
traffic being channeled back through the SADCC ports of Beira, Dar-es-Salaam, Nacala, 
Benguela, Maputo. But initially the shift will be to South African ports, then a slower 
shift back may be witnessed in the long run. The shift back to SADCC ports will depend 
on how much exports/imports from these countries will increase and congest the South 
African ports.
VII. Energy
1 .Current energy situation
South Africa produces more than 60 percent of the electricity generated on the entire 
continent of Africa, and it is also the largest and the world technological leader in coal- 
based energy production. The Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM), founded in 1922, 
supplies more than 93 percent of electricity in South Africa. A national transmission grid 
system supplies users with electricity through over 116,000 km of overheard powerlines, 
and over 7,700 km of underground cables. At least 23 power stations supply the system 
and over 83 percent of power supplied by ESCOM is from coal-fired stations. About 
10 percent of the electricity is imported from Cahora Bassa hydro power station in 
Mozambique, while about 2 percent is from local hydro and gas-turbine stations. 
Mozambique benefits in foreign currency earnings from the sale of hydroelectricity to 
South Africa. Electricity accounts for 20 percent of South Africa total energy usage and 
the demand is expected to increase to more than 34,000 million in 1990 and 72,000 million 
in the year 2000.
In 1950 the SASOL Ltd project was established to manufacture petroleum products 
from coal. It is now the world leader in the gasification and liquefaction of coal. Due to 
the oil crisis in 1973, the Sasol II plant was createJ in 1974, and Sasol III was to start 
production in 1982. When all three plants are fully in operation they will consume 32 mil­
lion tons of coal per year. South Africa, has through the Southern Oil Exploration
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Company (Soekor), intensified the search for oil and gas in the country and gas findings 
off the southern coast have prompted drilling.
One interesting energy feature is the presence of Uranium, for nuclear power. ESCOM 
is administering the distribution of electricity from a nuclear power station. The station, 
comprising two pressurized water nuclear reactors of 922 mw, started operation in 1982 
and 1983. Uranium enrichment also exists for supplying the nuclear station. Nuclear 
power is viable in South Africa since the country holds the second largest reserves of 
uranium in the Western World and is also the second largest supplier.
Let us now look at the SADCC energy situation. Regional cooperation within the 
SADCC region has been in some cases been superseded by national interest goals for self- 
sufficiency. In this respect, Zimbabwe's position regarding the coal-fired Hwange 
electrical power station comes under scrutiny. This plant, built at a cost of $1 billion with 
some finance from the World Bank, has not only swelled Zimbabwe's debt, but also 
jeopardized electrical energy imports from Zambia and Mozambique. Zimbabwe, through 
a deal in November 1987 with Zambia, now imports about 250 MW of electricity from that 
country, which is half of what it used to buy and even below the UDI level. The Hwange 
plant has led to an increase in electricity tariffs for local consumers, that are quite 
substantial for people who also had to pay tax surcharges for its building costs.
But progress has been made and is under way in some spheres but only on a small scale. 
Kazungula in Western Zimbabwe and Kasane in Northern Botswana were linked to the 
Zambia grid in 1987 at a cost of $2 million given by the Finish and Canadian 
Governments. For the funds provided by Norway, Malawi would link with Mozambique 
where power from the Malawi grid would service Northern Mozambique. Other 
crossborder links between Mozambique and Swaziland, and Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania, 
are being considered.
Zimbabwe is also connected to Mozambique systems mainly through Mutane to the 
Chicamba-Mauazi system and Beira for emergency uses. A line linking Zimbabwe 
directly to the Cahora Bassa, in which Zimbabwe would purchase 660 MW is under 
consideration. This line is estimated to be S300 cheaper than building another coal fired 
power plant in the coal town of Hwange.
Botswana is building a 100 MW link in order to purchase cheap hydroelectric power 
from Zambia and the project is expected to be completed by the end of 1990. The power 
will be brought through the Zimbabwe grid under an agreement. Botswana already has a
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coal fired Morupule power station. It would be less economic to expand it to obtain the 
100 MW than it would be to it import from Zambia. Mozambique is considering a 
hydropower project in Corumana and Lesotho is also constructing a hydropower station. 
The money for these projects has been pledged by Norway (SI 1 million) for Lesotho, and 
Sweden and Norway ($11 million) for Mozambique. Lesotho is considering the US$55 mil­
lion Oxbow hydroelectric project with the aim of reducing its dependence on South 
Africa.
Oil, another source of energy is the largest single import in the SADCC region with the 
exception of Angola which produces its own oil. Most refineries in SADCC member states 
are uneconomic to run. The countries are better importing refined products than engaging 
in uneconomic refining of crude oil. Angola is the exception in this case, because its oil 
production and refinery is efficient and the country is an exporter of oil.
In Zimbabwe, Lonrho and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) are 
extending the Beira-pipelinc to Harare, at a cost of $42 million, through their joint 
venture company Petrozim. The pipeline will also service Botswana and Malawi. The 
pipeline linking Ndola in Zambia and Dar-es-Salaam is being rehabilitated as well.
2.Future energy policies
South Africa derives more than 85 percent of its electrical power supply from coal 
fired power stations. Three issues pertaining to this type of power generation can be 
addressed for shaping future energy policies. Firstly, coal is an exhaustible and 
nonrecyclable resource. Even though for South Africa coal is basically its 'black gold* 
with such vast deposits, the resource is still depletable. In the long run it will not be 
feasible to supply electricity from dwindling coal reserves. The country will have to 
import the coal, from neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe which also has substantial 
reserves.
Secondly, the negative environmental externalities, caused by the burning of coal 
should not be underestimated. We have already been alerted to the dangers of pollution 
destroying the ozone layer and causing global warming. This is a subject that has found its 
way into international forums and theaters and the need to reduce such pollution is ever 
increasing. Coal fired power stations are environmentally hazardous and should be 
gradually reduced. This is an approach that uses one type of environmentally hazardous
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energy (coal) to produce a nonhazardous energy (electricity). The costs of producing this 
energy are measured using private marginal cost and average cost, rather than a higher 
marginal social cost and average social cost.
Finally, the tariff structure of the chemically/mechanically produced electricity is 
unfavorable to consumers. The power is more expensive than hydroelectric power which 
uses natural potential energy from falling water to turn turbines.
Regarding nuclear power which South Africa has recently brought into use, that again 
is a hazardous technology. This is not only a technology intensive approach, but the 
dangers of a nuclear accident are always lingering. It has been quite characteristic for 
technical experts to leave an African country once it acquires independence, and this does 
not exclude nuclear scientists. Therefore, the possibility of a shortage of nuclear experts 
after the independence of South Africa, threatens the viability of nuclear power as a 
viable future energy source.
In a post-independence South Africa, we would be persuaded to think that it should 
reconsider its energy policies. Given some of the problems above, more hydroelectric 
power should be imported from Cahora Bassa and the hydropower station currently being 
built in Lesotho, for instance. The country already imports 10 percent of its electricity 
from Cahora Bassa and should consider increasing this share. This would not only boost 
Mozambique’s exports but provide South African consumers with cheaper and safe 
electricity.
The same goes for Zimbabwe which has developed the coal-fired Hwange station.
Coal is an exhaustible resource, it is environmentally hazardous, and the whole 
chemical/mechanical process has raised electricity tariffs for consumers and the national 
debt. An economic alternative is to import cheap electricity from Cahosa Bassa in 
Mozambique and indeed from Zambia. All this would foster more regional cooperation in 
Southern Africa in the energy sector.
VIII. Policies for improving regional trade relations
Impediments to regional trade have been the cause of low intraregional trade in 
Southern Africa amounting to just under 5 percent of all total trade from the region.
Trade with the rest of the world has flourished and will continue to do so unless bold steps 
are taken to improve regional trade for complementing trade with the rest of the world. In
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this section we shall address policy issues for reducing some obstacles to regional trade 
which we believe are within the capacity of the countries to do so.
Impediments to regional trade can be divided into Tour groups each with several 
categories. In essence the groups are:
- size of the regional market and need for a Southern Africa 
Common Market Area (Sa CMA);
-  economic policies;
- administrative policies;
- policies for combating natural trade barriers.
We shall look at each type of policies in turn.
I.Southern Africa Common Market Area fSACMAl
The population of the SADCC countries, which excludes South Africa and Namibia is 
nearly 65 million people, with an aggregate GDP worth only 25 percent of that of South 
Africa and Namibia. The small market is quite restrictive in terms of absorbing regional 
trade. After the situation has normalized in South Africa, SADCC members have to think 
seriously about the relevance of the organization. SADCC which was founded in 1980, 
had and still has the objective of reducing dependence on South Africa and increasing 
collective self-reliance. With a normalized situation in South Africa, SADCC based on the 
current structure and objectives would be irrelevant.
We would posit that when that time comes a new regional organization in Southern 
Africa, which in this discussion we refer to as the Southern Africa Common Market Area 
(SACMA), should be considered. SACMA would have to include South Africa and 
Namibia and all SADCC countries. The inclusion of South Africa would increase the 
regional population to about 100 million people, with a GDP of not less than 
US$90,000 million and GDP per capita not less than US$900 per annum.
Benefits from SACMA would be to minimize the duplication of products, reduce 
wasteful competition, create cheaper and more efficient transport system, enhance a 
greater division of labor, enhance collective self-reliance and above all increase the 
regional market. These are general perceived advantages of regional cooperation and 
integration which can only be achieved and realized through a committed pursuit of the 
objectives, by the participating countries.
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The world seems to be moving closer to creating trading blocs. The European 
Economic Community will finally merge into one integrated regional economy in 1992. 
This may mean nonmembers of the community will find it increasingly difficult to export 
to that market. United States is also moving closer to forming a trading bloc with Latin 
America and Canada, which would result in another closed market in the Western 
Hemisphere. The Asian market under Japanese leadership and domination is also yet 
another trading bloc. Then where does that leave Africa? This is all the more reason why 
trade organizations in different regions of Africa are necessary. The trade organizations 
should also interact with each other in the spirit of larger African market.
In the SACMA region trade tariffs would have to be substantially reduced or removed, 
such liberalization would only cover SACMA goods in the hope of increasing trade. 
SACMA members would also be prohibited from entering into trade arrangements with 
nonmembers in a way that jeopardizes SACMA regional trade, unless permission is granted 
by SACMA.
Within SACMA, South Africa would play a dominant role being the most advanced 
country in the region. Within this framework, nationalistic and inward oriented policies 
would hinder the persuance of total integration. It is such behavior that has plagued and 
indeed destroyed regional trade arrangements all over the world and thus should be kept to 
the unavoidable minimum.
2.Economic policies
a.Production of similar commodities
What is striking but presumably expected, is the production and export of similar 
products by Southern African countries. Countries produce the same agricultural goods 
such as tobacco, tea, coffee, beef, and in manufacturing, textile products are ubiquitous. 
And yet the largest import into all the countries is machinery and equipment, which is 
imported from the developed world.
Domestic policies should be geared towards giving incentives for diversification, 
especially in manufacturing. Also, a problem of absence of uniform regional standards 
exists. There are no clear uniform standards for goods produced for the region. Such 
specification of standards would have to be worked out, among member countries,
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presumably by setting up a SACMA Bureau of Standards, to track down sub-standard 
tradable goods.
b.Policies for developing supporting facilities
( I information gathering
Of paramount importance in market oriented trading is the availability and access to 
information for both importers and exporters in the region. There is no available central 
information center and besides the costs of gathering such information may be prohibitive. 
In some cases information pertaining to available markets is not accessible or simply does 
not exist.
To the extent that private companies and their governments would benefit from some 
information arrangements, they should aggressively support a central pool of information. 
Here we have in mind the Trade Fairs organized by the International Trade Centre (ITC). 
Governments and the private sector should take an active role in financing and exhibiting 
in ITC trade fairs and domestic trade fairs to improve market understanding, business 
contacts, and information exchange.
(2VTrade financing and insurance policies
One factor that has hindered trade in the region is the lack of adequate credit facilities 
to pay for the goods and insure then while in transit. When the Letter of Credit (LOC) is 
not adequately covered by some financial institutions the trade deal is reduced to 
imprompt cash payments by importers. The corollary is a fall in the volume of trade as 
both importers and exporters are equally frustrated.
Banks would have to be encouraged to take more risk in covering LOC. Insurance . 
companies as well should be less risk averse in giving insurance cover for traded goods in 
the region. Banks tend to avoid risk rather than manage risk. As markets become more 
active and competitive, banks would have to learn and be willing to manage more risk 
rather than to avoid it. To ensure that trade credit facilities exist, countries should 
consider setting up Trade Banks whose sole purpose is to finance and insure trade among 
countries in the region in the same way as in South Korea and Japan, the success stories.
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^ Infrastructure development policies
Policies for developing infrastructure for transport, communication and energy 
resources have been discussed above. At the risk of repeting the discussion above, 
seaports should be improved and be much more efficiently utilized. Railway charges for 
transporting goods between countries would have to be reviewed with the intention of 
lowering them. High tariffs may prohibit a rather lucrative trade flow among countries 
and efforts have to be made to reduce them. Communication facilities should be 
developed further. Already a microwave link already exists within Southern Africa. This 
should only be the beginning of the development of a sophisticated communication system 
in the region for facilitating not only trade relations but to satisfy basic human consumer 
needs.
3.Stimulating private entrepreneurship
The presence and promotion of a large public sector in some countries has crowded out 
the development of private entrepreneurship. The absence of competition to sharpen the 
state monopoly companies has allowed them to degenerate and maintain unprofitable 
operations. Subsidies have been poured into the ailing parastatals not only to keep them on 
the break even line, but also in the name of providing cheap basic goods and services to 
the poor. Even the poor would not afford to live with companies that fuel the budget 
deficit and hence swell the foreign and domestic debt of the central government. This 
infringes on intergenerational equity as future generations, including children of the poor, 
would have to pay more taxes to cover the debts.
Under conditions of inadequate communication, private enterprise in Southern Africa 
finds it difficult to instill confidence in fellow businessman. Communication and the 
ability to pursue contacts and enquiries, and honor contracts has hampered the 
development of entrepreneurship.
The current flexibility being shown towards privatization of parastatals has not gone 
far enough. Privatization should be an objective of governments where possible, in order 
to stimulate profitable trade links in the region.
30
4 .Macroeconomic policies
There has never been any more need for better and sound macroeconomic policies in  
Southern A frica than in the eighties. The search for such policies in the com ing nine tees 
should also be geared towards the regional market. For instance, should monetary and 
currency union, exchange rale rationalization, trade tariffs rationalization, and interest 
rate parity, be the flagship policies o f the Southern A frica Common Market?
To avoid the settlem ent o f regional trade in hard currency, monetary union should be 
one objective o f SACMA. Monetary onion would aim at establishing som e common 
currency which we shall refer to here as the SACMA dollar. Each country in the region 
could be allowed to use their individual currencies, but the exchange rate against the 
SACMA dollar for each currency would have to be determined on the regional basis. One 
way o f determining the exchange rate is to  w eight it by the amount o f trade the particular 
country has in the region or peg it on the SIM , which is also a weighted exchange rate.
To allow som e flexib ility within the eic*iange rate system  each currency would have an 
exchange rate band within which it is allowed to fluctuate against the SACMA dollar.
This would be some form o f exchange rate targeting. O f course, the earnest approach is  to  
have exchange rate parity among the currencies, where the exchange rate is unity. T his is 
the case hi the Rand Monetary Area (RM A) which currently coven  South A frica, L esotho, 
Swaziland, and Namibia.
Also management o f money supply, interest rates and inflation would have to be 
rationalized. Monetary policy would have to be managed in such a way that it poses no 
excessive inflation pressures and keeps interest rates volatility at in  minimum. The ideal 
case is to align the supply o f money and inflation levels in accordance with the purchasing 
power parity (PIT ) law. But this is only the ideal case, not easily achievable in the real 
situations. But the idea would be to keep inflation d ifferentials, at the prevailing 
exchange rates, at their unavoidable minimum.
The rationalization o f interest rates should accompany the overall monetary policy. 
Again, the ideal situation is one o f interest rate parity that would rid the region o f any 
excessive move ment o f capital to one particular country with high interest rates. B et th is 
again is not easy to achieve in reality. SACMA countries would have to m inim ize real 
interest rate differentials in order to stop excessive  ewve n ent o f  capital to  only those 
countries that amimaia above average interest rales and below average rates o f inflation.
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Equally pertinent, is the management of fiscal policy. Tight budgetary expenditure by 
governments would be ideal to keep demand pull inflation down and money supply within' 
the targeted levels. Government budget deficits in Southern Africa have been fueled by 
recurrent expenditure while capital investment has remained quite low. The aim would be 
to reduce the recurrent expenditure component of the budget, and allow capital investment 
to increase.
It cannot be overemphasized that trade tariffs would have to be reduced to allow freer 
movement of goods and services across countries. Import barriers in the form of high 
import duties impede and prevent region trade. In some countries high import tariffs have 
been imposed with the argument of protecting an "infant industry" even when such an 
industry does not exist. Invariably, revenue from tariffs are merely used for financing 
recurrent expenditure in the budget deficit. For some goods bought from the region, 
tariffs would have to be removed completely to promote mutually beneficial trade 
relations.
5.Reeional stock exchanges and capital markets
A stock exchange is the centrepiece of capital markets in an economy, enabling private 
investors to buy and sell their shares held in companies, in the Southern African region 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in South Africa is the largest and the oldest, 
followed by the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. Botswana's Stock Exchange has just been 
established about a year ago, in 1989.
We have heard arguments for a joint SADCC stock market to attract private investment 
in the region. A regional stock exchange would have its advantages in the sense that it 
would be a big market that attracts big capital. But this would also be its disadvantage, 
because small companies that may wish to raise capital may fail to qualify as members of a 
big regional stock exchange. We would argue, therefore, for each country to have its own 
stock exchange. To encourage private investment in the region, we would want to see 
joint listings of companies in regional stock exchanges. This would encourage cross- 
border investment.
The role of the stock exchanges would be to facilitate the privatization process and to 
raise capital in both rights issues and new floatations. New issues should be encouraged to 
allow new investors rather than the popular rights issues which allow the already-owners
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of shares to buy more shares. The stock exchange would also be utilized for disciplining 
inefficient companies, through the share price quotation process. One use of the stock 
exchange is for promoting the process of ’natural selection* of the most efficient 
companies through mergers and takeovers.
Needless to say that with joint listings of companies across countries would have to be 
accompanied by less controls on capital movements. Botswana is the only country in the 
region with virtually free exchange and capital movements. To instill confidence in cross- 
border investors, capital controls within the region should be minimized.
While we argue for the establishment of stock exchanges in the region, we have to bear 
in mind South Korea, which developed with a small stock market. But the stock market is 
one way of attracting private investment which is desperately needed in Southern Africa.
Banking activity is showing signs of expansion. Zimbank, one of the five commercial 
banks in Zimbabwe, has openned a branch in Botswana. South African banks which are 
already in Namibia may expand to Zimbabwe and Botswana. This opens doors for more 
flow of capital at the intra-bank level. It is one way for liberalizing capital flows within 
the region. The banking sector would also face more competition and would offer better 
banking services and be more willing to manage risk rather than avoid it, which is 
currently the case.
6.Removin« administrative barriers
Administrative barriers to trade in the region may be technical and/or political. 
Technical administrative barriers refer to the complex rules and regulations traders have to 
go through just to enact a single transaction. Political administrative controls are based on 
the need to preserve national identity and protecting what is domestic, essentially a fear of 
domination by other nations.
a.Technical rules and regulations
Import licensing regulations impede the flow of intra-regional trade. Initially, an 
importer has to apply for the foreign exchange which has to be approved by the Central 
Bank, and the approval is not immediate but takes weeks and may be months. Once the 
foreign exchange has been approved then one can purchase the commodity. Once the
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commodity has been transferred to the customs department in the importer’s country, he 
has to apply for an import license to allow the goods into the country and pay customs 
duty on them as well. The import licensing process is tedious and often so inefficient that 
it even erodes the productive efficiency of enterprises by slowing down the availability of 
imported vital raw materials.
What has also hampered intra-regional trade is complex regulations, especially those 
pertainirg to the amount of local content in the exported goods. The regulations, which 
are meant to promote regionally produced goods, have good intentions, but the 
bureaucratic procedures involved in determining the amount of local content are tedious. 
While the regulations do prevent re-exports of imported commodities, bureaucratic 
inefficiencies reduce the volume of trade.
To increase the flow of trade in the region, import licensing activities, especially on 
machinery and equipment, should be reduced. Also demands on the level of local content 
in exported commodities should be more flexible, allowing for lower levels of local 
content.
b.Political controls
Political controls are a result and an accompaniment of inward-oriented nationalistic 
policies, driven by fears of domination by foreigners. This highlights a competitive rather 
than a cooperative spirit in regional integration. Countries compete to be the largest 
exporters in the region while cutting down on regional imports by branding them inferior 
to their own or openly suggesting that there is nothing to import from their neighbors.
The law of comparative and competitive advantage should take precedence over 
political and economically inferior inward-oriented policies.
7.Reducing effects of natural trade barriers
Natural barriers to intraregional trade includes population size, geographic location, 
and market size as measured by incomes per capita. The population is also part of the 
market size.
In Southern Africa the population is only about 100 million people, only equaling that 
of Nigeria. Countries such as Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, and Namibia, have small ■
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populations that reduce the size of the domestic market. Some countries such as Namibia 
and Botswana, have large deserts, the Namib desert in the case of Namibia and Kalahari 
desert in the case of Botswana. Lesotho is quite mountainous and environmental 
degradation has resulted from that. As a result of the deserts and mountains, some 
sections of these countries are uninhabited and uninhabitable, the corollary being low 
population densities per square km.
Low incomes per capita add to small markets in Southern Africa. Mozambique and 
Tanzania have GDPs per capita that are below US$120 per annum, while Malawi and 
Lesotho have GDPs per capita that are above US$200 and yet still below US$220 per 
annum.
Six countries in Southern Africa, namely Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe are landlocked. They have no direct access to the sea and 
seaports. This only leaves South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania as 
the countries with seaports. Lesotho’s case is the most peculiar because it is completely 
surrounded by South Africa, making its position in the current circumstances rather 
difficult.
As we have alluded to earlier, one way of increasing access to seaports in future would 
be to use the South African ports which handle more cargo, once the situation in that 
country normalizes. The Mozambican ports of Maputo, Beira, and Nacala, and the Dar- 
es-Salaam port in Tanzania, need further rehabilitation to handle more cargo for the land­
locked countries. More on this has already been discussed under the section on transport 
and communication.
V. Conclusion
Intra-regional trade in Southern Africa is small, amounting to just below 5 percent of 
all external trade in the region. One major impediment to regional trade is that the 
countries are all nearly at the same stage of development, essentially producing similar 
mining and agricultural commodities, and other raw materials. Trade is therefore difficult 
if there is no heterogeneity of commodities.
Import tariffs and administrative licensing procedu.es impede the flow of intra- 
regional trade. Besides, even when demand for imports exists information about it is not 
available to traders in those markets. One other factor is the lack of trust and fear of
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domination by other countries that have higher incomes per capital and generally better 
economies.
The issue of migrant laborers in South Africa may cause problems in the future when 
that country normalizes. South Africans will claim their jobs and foreigners will naturally 
lose them. Back home, governments will be faced with mounting unemployment 
problems.
Energy sources in the region need better conceptualizing. Electricity should be sourced 
where it is cheap, such as in Cahora Bassa in Mozambique and Zambia. Coal driven 
thermal power electricity such as that produced in South Africa is not only expensive but 
has the negative environmental costs of pollution.
Investment on transport routes should be increased. Railways and ports need further 
revamping and transport tariffs should be more competitive.
When the situation in South Africa normalizes, countries in Southern Africa should 
come together under a Southern Africa Common Market Area (SACMA), that may include 
monetary and exchange rate union. This regional organization would give the region more 
access to seaports in South Africa, more intra-regional trade and better regional energy 
policies and communication. The South African Customs Union (SACU), Rand Monetary 
Area (RMa ), Southern Africa Development and Coordination Conference (SADCC), 
Preferential Trade Area (PTA), may have to give way to a bigger regional trade 
organization which includes South Africa and Namibia. The new preferential trade 
organization would have to work with other African trade organizations towards creating 
an Africa-wide preferential trade area.
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T a b l e  2 .  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a :  O p e n n e s s  a n d  C u r r e n t  A c c o u n t ,  1988
--
Degree of Openness (1988)
Current account as percentage of GDP (1988) •
Angola • • •Botswana 0.97 +17.0Lesotho 1.51 -18.0Malawi 0.51 -8.0Mozaabique . • . . . .Swaziland 1.32 +12.0Tanzania 0.50 -10.0Zambia 0.69 -11.0Zimbabwe 0.58 +0.9South Africa 0.51 +2.0Namibia 1.13 +5.0 1/
Source: International Financial Statistics (IPS).
1/ Estimate.
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T a b l e  3 .  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a :  G i n i - H i r s c h n a n  C o n c e n t r a t i o n  I n d e x ,  1987
Country GH Index
Angola ...Botswana 0.8497Lesotho . . •Malawi 0.6441Mozaobique 0.5255Swaziland . . *Tanzania 0.4292Zimbabwe 0.3626Zaabia 0.9325South Africa and N'aaibia 0.8931
•39-v
T a b le  4 .  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a n  D e v e lo p m e n t a n d  C o o r d i n a t i o n
Conference (SADCC): Regional Trade,, 1970-87
1970 1979 1982 1984 1987
Percentage of SADCC exports to 
SADCC countries re s t of the world
4.5
95.5 2.897.2 4.695.4 4.395.7 4.395.7
Percentage of SADCC imports froa 
SADCC countries re s t of the world
5.4
94.6 2.697.4 3.996.1 4.295.8 4.695.8
Percentage of to ta l  trade 






Source: Hanlon. J . (1980), SADCC in the 1990s, II'J , London, p..60.
- 4 0 -
T a b l e  5 .  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a :  T r a d e  b y  C o u n t r y ,  1 98 7
Country Percent of imports percent of exports
Angola 2.2 • • •Botswana 20.9 20.2Lesotho 1.1 0.1Malawi 8.5 3.5Mozambique 23.1 1.4Swaziland 0.8 7.8Tanzania 4.6 2.1Zambia 12.0 10.8Zimbabwe 26.8 54.0
Total 100 100
Source: Kanlon, J. 1989, 5ADCC in the 1990s, LIU, London, p.60.
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(In millions of rand)
T a b l e  8 .  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a :  R e m i t t a n c e s  a n d  D e f e r r e d  P a y m e n t s ,  1 9 8 0 - 8 5
Country of 1980 1983 1985origin
Angola 0.1 0.1 0.1Botswana 32.0 47.6 76.2Lesotho 153.3 280.6 401.2Malawi 30.7 51.3 77.3
Mozambique 66.6 116.8 189.5Swaziland 13.2 22.1 61.3Zambia 0.6 1.0 1.5Zimbabwe 15.4 8.7 1j  . oOther 3.5 139.6 220.5
Total 215.4 677.3 1,041,'
Source: Laistner, E. and Esterhuysen, ?. (1388). South Africa ir.Southern Africa, Africa In s ti tu te ,  p.I26.
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Table 9. Southern Africa: -.Railway Distances to Major Ports in SADCC and South Africa
(In kilometers)
















— 2,812 3,1163,130 3,434
2,077 2,404-- 1,859 1,921
-- 1,663 1,725— 1,409 1,289
840 3,342 3,669
777 1,016
Source: J. Hanlon, SADCC: Progress, Projects and Prosnects, Sit,1984, p.25.
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(In alllions of tons)
T a b l e  1 0 .  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a :  Goods  T r a f f i c  c n  t h e  T a r a r a  L i n e ,  1 9 7 8 - 8 8
Year Overseas Local Total
1987 1 r\ *  1 252 i,2731981 ' ;47 205 7521986 527 364 8911987 •375 347 I 2211988 — — 1,1001995 1/ 1,200 7 00 ■ - 2,000




T a b l e  1 1 .  S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a :  Key A i r  R o u t e s ,  1987
SADCC SA TotalRoute Carriers Carriers Jasser.gsrs
5ADCC to SADCC
Harare-Lilongwe 67 0 — 670Harare-Lacanda 430 — 430
Harare-Gaborone 160 — 160Harare-^aputo 140 — 140Harare-Mansini 120 — 120
Luanda-Lusaka ICO — 100Lilor.gve-Dar-es-Salaaa 100 — 100
Liiongve-Dar-es-Salaaa 100 — 100
Other 615 — 515
i o t a 1
SADCC to South Africa
2 335 2 335
Harare-Johannesburg 890 700 1,590Gaborone-Johannesburg 360 330 690Lilor.gve-Johanr.esburg 225 400 52 c-Luar.da-Jo'nar.nesburg 36) 360 560Ma r. s i  n i  -  J o h a n r. e s b u r 3 150 2C0 520Maputo-Johannesburg 23*1 — 450Maseru-Johanr.esburg 385 150 335
Manzini-Durban — 140 150Harare-Durban — 2,480 140
Total SADCC-South Africa 2,630 2,480 5,110
Total regional weeklytrip s 4,965 2,480 7,445
Source: Hanlon, J. SADCC in the 1990*5, EIU, September 1989, London.
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